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549 
SYMPOSIUM 
VALUES, QUESTIONS, AND METHODS IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
INTRODUCTION 
JEREMY N. SHEFF† 
Intellectual property (“IP”) scholarship has a unique 
distinction among legal academic disciplines: some of its 
practitioners question whether the subject of their study ought to 
exist.  We should pause to consider how remarkable this is.  
Constitutional law scholars usually do not question whether 
political communities should be governed by constitutions.  
Criminal law scholars generally accept that the state ought to be 
able to define and punish crimes.  Contract law scholars do not 
question that some promises should be enforceable in court.  To 
be sure, in each of these disciplines there are hotly debated 
questions over the appropriate scope and justification for 
particular legal rules, and that is true for IP as well.  But 
perhaps the central theoretical question in IP debates—and 
particularly patent debates—is whether IP rights should exist at 
all, or whether we would be better served by some other system 
for regulating the creation and distribution of knowledge.1 
This skepticism has a long pedigree in American IP law.  In 
patent law, it encompasses Thomas Jefferson’s musings on how 
societies could reasonably disagree about whether patents 
“produce more embarrassment than advantage,”2 and Fritz 
Machlup’s ambivalent quip: 
 
 
† Professor of Law; Director, Intellectual Property Law Center, St. John’s 
University School of Law. 
1 See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes 
Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 304–05 (2013) (reviewing the literature). 
2 Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813). 
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If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on 
the basis of our present knowledge of its economic 
consequences, to recommend instituting one[, b]ut since we 
have had a patent system for a long time, it would be 
irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to 
recommend abolishing it.3 
America’s history of copyright law is less ambivalent but more 
checkered.  In the nineteenth century, America was a pirate 
nation, protecting the few works produced by its own citizens but 
refusing to grant copyrights over the far larger and more highly 
demanded body of works of authorship produced overseas.  Now 
that we have become a net exporter of copyrightable works, we 
have also become a net exporter of rightholder-favoring copyright 
laws, embedding protective Western—and particularly 
American—standards into international legal instruments such 
as TRIPS and bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.4 
Our ambivalence about the very existence of IP rights 
suggests an unsteady normative foundation for those rights.  The 
normative justifications offered for IP law have traditionally 
taken two forms in the American academic literature.  There are 
consequentialist justifications, which hold that IP rights exist to 
avoid the free-riding problems that attend production of 
nonrivalrous and nonexcludable “public goods,” such as 
inventions and works of authorship.  Under this view, a limited 
period of exclusivity gives creators a window to engage in 
supracompetitive monopoly pricing, allowing them to recoup 
their investment of time, effort and resources in production of 
intangible resources that are costly to create but cheap to copy.5  
 
3 SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT 
SYSTEM 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (review written by Fritz Machlup). 
4 For a discussion on the history of American copyright and the relationship 
between levels of cultural production and levels of copyright protection, see generally 
B. Zorina Khan, Does Copyright Piracy Pay? The Effects of US International 
Copyright Laws on the Market for Books, 1790-1920 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 10271, 2004). For a discussion on the extension of U.S. copyright 
law to developing countries through trade agreements, see Carsten Fink & Patrick 
Reichenmiller, Tightening TRIPS: Intellectual Property Provisions of U.S. Free 
Trade Agreements, in TRADE, DOHA, AND DEVELOPMENT: A WINDOW INTO THE 
ISSUES 285, 295–96 (Richard Newfarmer ed., 2006). 
5 See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of 
Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (1962); Richard A. Posner, Intellectual 
Property: The Law and Economics Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57 (2005). 
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Then there are deontological justifications, principally drawing 
on the labor-desert theories of John Locke, which hold that the 
labor undertaken in creating a new invention or work of 
authorship endows the creator with a moral claim to be 
compensated for—and to control—its use.6  In recent decades, 
these justifications have been examined using new methods, as 
IP law scholarship has taken what might be called an “empirical 
turn.”7 
One line of scholarship in this vein purports to test a 
fundamental premise of the consequentialist justification for IP 
laws: they incentivize people to create new inventions and works 
of authorship.  We may call this premise the “incentive thesis.”8  
Much of the new empirical evidence suggests that in some 
circumstances, for some purposes, the incentive thesis is false.  
For example, the innovative experiments reported by our 
panelists Chris Buccafusco, Jeanne Fromer, and Chris Sprigman 
demonstrate that small pecuniary incentives do not correlate 
positively with creative or innovative activity or outputs in 
discrete short-term tasks.9  Of course, other empirical work is 
consistent with the theory that for works that require a 
significant and long-term investment of effort or resources—such 
as classical operas—the incentives provided by IP rights do, in 
fact, increase production.10  Thus the empirical data, as a whole,  
 
 
 
6 See generally Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the 
Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005); Wendy J. Gordon, A 
Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of 
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993). 
7 See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The 
Role of Scholarship in Federal Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 
667, 669–70 nn.9–10 (2002). 
8 The turn of phrase is borrowed from Professor Jonathan Barnett. See, e.g., 
Jonathan M. Barnett, Do Patents Matter? Empirical Evidence on the Incentive 
Thesis, in HANDBOOK ON LAW, INNOVATION AND GROWTH 178 (Robert E. Litan ed., 
2011); Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on 
Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 
1381, 1381–82 (2005). 
9 St. John’s Intellectual Property Law Center, St. John’s IPLC 2016 Symposium 
| Panel 3: Methods, YOUTUBE (Nov. 15, 2016), https://youtu.be/ud6D9kEFsnI 
[hereinafter “Panel 3”]. 
10 See generally Michela Giorcelli & Petra Moser, Copyright and Creativity: 
Evidence from Italian Operas (Oct. 19, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2505776). 
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suggests that the incentive thesis is not categorically true or 
categorically false across all the areas of human endeavor on 
which IP law has purchase. 
A second line of empirical scholarship attempts to quantify 
the costs of IP rights.  Such research typically focuses on the 
most readily measurable aspect of those costs: litigation costs.  
Again, empirical researchers dispute the magnitude of those 
costs, and even the proper basis for measurement.11  Other 
components of the costs of IP law—such as the deadweight losses 
that result from excluding people from access to goods and 
services covered by IP rights based on their ability and 
willingness to pay, and the loss of follow-on contributions that 
could have been made by those so excluded—appear frequently in 
theoretical discussions but are much harder to get a handle on 
empirically.12 
Yet, a third line of empirical scholarship attempts to 
determine whether IP rights are necessary to generate 
innovative and creative activity.13  The key theme in this line of 
research is identification of industries and fields of endeavor 
where creativity and innovation emerge without any IP rights.14  
Underlying this inquiry is the theoretical argument that other 
legal regimes—prizes, government sponsorship, or a laissez-faire 
approach—can provide satisfactory or even preferable substitutes 
for IP rights.15 
In a recent lecture, one of our panelists, Mark Lemley, 
reviewed the body of current empirical scholarship along these 
lines and concluded that the evidence in support of the 
 
11 Compare JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW 
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 120–46 (2008), with 
David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in 
the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425 (2014). 
12 See Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012 
WIS. L. REV. 891, 950 (2012) (“The challenge that has always confronted those who 
have attempted to link copyright enforcement with lost innovation involves the 
difficulty of tracing exactly what we have lost. One cannot pinpoint with certainty 
technologies that would have developed if history had followed a different course.”). 
13 This is to be distinguished from the first line of research, which attempts to 
determine whether such incentives are sufficient to generate creative or innovative 
activity. 
14 See generally, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE 
KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012). 
15 See generally Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: 
When Is It the Best Incentive System?, in 2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 
51, 52–53 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2002). 
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consequentialist justification for IP law is “decidedly 
ambiguous.”16  He notes that while earlier ambivalence about 
consequentialist justifications for IP could have been based on 
ignorance, we now have enough evidence to conclude that IP 
“probably [is]n’t helping much, or [i]s only helping people in a few 
specialized areas, and might in fact be making things worse.”17  
In Professor Lemley’s view, this ambiguity suggests that recent 
expansionist trends in IP law have been a mistake, and that even 
maintaining current levels of IP protection ought to be 
reconsidered.18 
The failure of empirical evidence to support consequentialist 
justifications for IP has also been noted by another of our 
panelists, Rob Merges.19  But Professor Merges’s response to the 
indeterminacy of empirical assessment of IP laws has been to 
investigate other justifications for intellectual property—
alternatives drawn from deontological philosophical authorities 
such as Locke, Kant, and Rawls.20  These two leading lights of 
the IP academy have sparred in print over the implications of the 
move away from consequentialism—Lemley deriding appeals to 
deontological reasoning as “faith-based,” and Merges defending 
his approach—in this Symposium Issue—as “pluralist” insofar as 
it accommodates both consequences and abstract moral claims.21  
In print, each of these authors has accused the other of closing 
his mind to arguments inconsistent with their approach to the 
problem, but in person, at our Symposium, we managed to have a 
collegial discussion, revealing much common ground.22  I suspect 
this is because their disagreement over the implications of recent 
empirical scholarship on IP is not, in fact, as profound as it might 
appear, and that the real issue is a much more serious challenge  
 
 
 
16 Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328, 
1334 (2015). 
17 Id. at 1334–35. 
18 Id. 
19 ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2–3 (2011). 
20 See id. at x. 
21 Robert P. Merges, Against Utilitarian Fundamentalism, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
681 (2016). 
22 St. John’s Intellectual Property Law Center, St. John’s IPLC 2016 
Symposium | Panel 1: Values, YOUTUBE (Nov. 14, 2016), 
https://youtu.be/FENnzTkGUkw. 
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to the work of legal scholars who study IP.  This Introduction 
discusses why I think that is the case, and where I think we 
ought to go from here. 
We might begin by asking why we think the types of 
empirical research discussed above are useful.  Professor Lemley 
suggests that he views empirical scholarship as part of a 
Popperian scientific process in which theories of how the world 
works are tested for resistance to falsification.23  But if this is our 
model, the epistemic humility of Popper’s theory of science must 
be borne in mind: Popper explicitly abandoned any notion of 
scientific truth.24  In other words, Popperian science cannot tell 
us what is true; the best it can do is tell us which of two 
competing stories is less plausible.  It is worth remembering 
what Popper himself had to say about this: 
Scientific theories can never be “justified”, or verified.  But in 
spite of this, a hypothesis A can under certain circumstances 
achieve more than a hypothesis B—perhaps because B is 
contradicted by certain results of observations, and therefore 
“falsified” by them, whereas A is not falsified . . . . The best we 
can say of a hypothesis is that up to now it has been able to 
show its worth, and that it has been more successful than other 
hypotheses although, in principle, it can never be justified, 
verified, or even shown to be probable.25 
If this is our standard, then specifying our theories becomes 
a problem of crucial importance.  For example, what exactly is 
the consequentialist justification that we might be trying to 
falsify?  One possibility is the incentive thesis itself: the 
hypothesis that, all else being equal, promising a property right 
over the fruits of creative or innovative activity will induce 
individuals to undertake and complete such activity more 
frequently than they otherwise would.  On this point, Professor 
Lemley is clearly right to claim that the evidence is “decidedly 
ambiguous” as to a context-independent version of the incentive 
thesis, and less ambiguous—though less consistent—when we 
begin specifying particular types of creative or innovative 
activities or particular types of incentives. 
 
23 Lemley, supra note 16, at 1346 n.67. 
24 This is particularly so for the elusive truth by induction that has haunted 
empiricist epistemology at least since Hume: Popper literally claimed “there is no 
such thing as induction.” KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 18 
(Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005). 
25 Id. at 317. 
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But we must remember that the incentive thesis is not in 
itself a justification for IP rights; it is just one piece of the 
argument.  The ultimate question in consequentialist normative 
assessments of policy is whether the policy has a positive effect 
on outcomes compared to some baseline alternative policy.  In 
most consequentialist approaches, the outcome of interest is 
some version of aggregate social welfare, and the means for 
assessing it is some form of cost-benefit analysis.  Within this 
welfarist normative framework, the attractiveness of attempting 
to falsify the incentive thesis is understandable: if the incentive 
thesis were always and everywhere false, and the creation of new 
inventions and works of authorship were the only benefit flowing 
from IP laws, we could short circuit our analysis.  We would 
conclude that the benefits generated by IP are—relative to the 
absence of IP—less than or equal to zero, meaning we need not 
consider the costs of IP at all to find it unjustified.  Evidence that 
the incentive thesis is true in some circumstances but not in 
others defeats this strategy in part:  A consequentialist must 
consider the social costs of IP rights in at least those 
circumstances where they generate creative activity, and 
somehow attempt to compare those costs to the value of that 
activity.  In such circumstances, the hypothesis we really care 
about—and should be attempting to test against alternative 
hypotheses using the criterion of falsification—is that the 
benefits of IP are greater than its costs.  A Popperian welfarist 
interested in justifying IP rights—or their elimination—would 
thus need, at a minimum, empirical evidence on both costs and 
benefits. 
But before we even reach that point, a deeper problem 
remains: there may be other benefits to IP laws that a cost-
benefit analysis would need to take into account, besides the 
generation of creative outputs.  We can begin to understand the 
nature and scope of this problem by considering the value of 
creative work to creators themselves.  For example, Rebecca 
Tushnet argues that many people deeply enjoy engaging in 
creative work: they feel motivated to create and derive personal 
satisfaction and fulfillment from doing so, independent of any 
pecuniary compensation.26  Relatedly, Professor Merges places 
 
26 See Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace 
Assumptions, 51 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 513, 526–527 (2009). 
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particular weight on the autonomy of creative professionals who 
are able to earn a living from their creative efforts under an IP 
regime.27  Both of these phenomena—the fact that creators derive 
personal satisfaction from the process of creation itself and the 
fact that creators can enjoy material security while pursuing 
such personally fulfilling activities according to their own 
wishes—would seem to be relevant to an assessment of a legal 
regime that purports to channel and regulate creative activity by 
reference to the benefits that flow from such activity.  But both 
authors argue that the phenomena they identify simply cannot 
be properly accounted for in a consequentialist framework.28 
I think it is an overstatement to claim that a 
consequentialism premised on cost-benefit analysis can’t account 
for these features of creative work.  However, attempting to do so 
reveals an essential incompleteness in consequentialist 
justifications for regulation of complex social phenomena, such as 
innovation and creativity, and exposes serious limitations on the 
power of empirical methods in evaluating such justifications.  
This is principally because such cost-benefit analysis requires 
costs and benefits to be quantified in ways that allow them to be 
measured and compared to one another, and the process of doing 
so is beset with contestable value judgments.  The pitfalls of 
attempting such quantification and comparison are frequently 
cited in critiques of cost-benefit analysis as it applies to health 
and safety regulations,29 but they are equally relevant to 
evaluation of IP. 
 
 
27 MERGES, supra note 19, at 195–236. 
28 Id. at 112 (“[E]ven if the special incentive of an IP right leads to a somewhat 
unequal distribution of resources . . . the right may be justified. It may enable 
someone to pursue her most cherished career goal, and to do so independently. The 
freedom to do this might well be worth the loss of some social value that would be 
provided if the creator worked for less money, or under less autonomous 
conditions.”); Tushnet, supra note 26, at 521–22 (“Creativity, as lived, is more than a 
response to incentives, working from fixed and random preferences.”). 
29 Compare Cass R. Sunstein, The Value of a Statistical Life: Some 
Clarifications and Puzzles, 4(2) J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 237, 238–39 (2013) 
(suggesting ways of incorporating critiques of quantification into cost-benefit 
analysis), with FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING 
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (arguing that many 
goods—particularly environmental goods—are not subject to the quantification that 
cost-benefit analysis requires). 
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We need not resort to life-and-death stakes to show how 
value judgments creep into any cost-benefit analysis of IP law.  
Take, for example, the autonomy enjoyed by a creative 
professional who is able to earn a living from her creative work, 
and the satisfaction she derives from doing so.  What is the value 
of her autonomy or her satisfaction?  How might we measure it?  
Should we try to quantify it in dollars?  Can we?  Is her income 
itself a proper measure?  Should we instead try to identify some 
alternative, more remunerative labor she might engage in, and 
treat the difference between her imputed foregone income from 
that labor and the income flowing from exercise of IP rights as 
the “value” of her autonomy?  If so, how?  Do we know what 
alternative labor she would have engaged in, or what the 
imputed income from it would be if we cannot observe either 
directly in the real world?  Should we instead ask her to put a 
dollar value on her autonomy or on the satisfaction she derives 
from creative work?  If she did so, should we take her estimate at 
face value?  Could we treat her answer as useful data? 
And what if the creative autonomy in question is not that of 
a rights-holder, but of a user—the “amateur” of Professor 
Merges’s discussion, or the fanfiction authors of Professor 
Tushnet’s analysis?  If stronger IP rights prevent these users 
from incorporating existing copyrighted works into their own 
creative endeavors, should we consider that a cost of those 
rights?  Again, how would we measure that cost?  How can we 
know what works are not getting created because a would-be 
creator is unable or unwilling to secure a license on terms 
demanded by a prior creator?30  How could we put a value on 
those uncreated works, even if we knew what they were?31 
When we do turn to questions of life and death, these 
fundamental uncertainties become even more unsettling.  What 
is the aggregate social benefit of a cure for a rare disease that 
kills ten people per year?  What about the benefit of a marginally 
improved treatment for a superficial health condition, like mildly 
itchy skin, that affects millions of people per year?  Can we 
 
30 See Carrier, supra note 12, at 950; see supra text accompanying note 12. 
31 I raised similar questions in an earlier comment on the debate between 
Professors Lemley and Merges. See Jeremy Sheff, Faith-Based vs. Value-Based IP: 
On the Lemley-Merges Debate, JEREMYSHEFF.COM (Apr. 2, 2015), 
https://jeremysheff.com/2015/04/02/faith-based-vs-value-based-ip-on-the-lemley-
merges-debate. 
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measure these benefits in dollars?  If so, how many millions of 
people with mosquito bites are equivalent to ten victims of a 
deadly disease?  For that matter, how many works of fanfiction 
would we be willing to give up to eradicate such a disease?  To 
more effectively relieve the mild itching of ten million people?32 
And here is perhaps the most difficult question of all: if we 
did ask the terminally ill, the mildly itchy, the creative 
professionals, and the fan-fiction authors of our examples to put 
a dollar value on these costs and benefits of their lived 
experiences, and they all gave us different answers, which 
answer should we plug in to our cost-benefit analysis?  Should it 
matter whether the difference in their answers is influenced by 
their heterogeneous pre-existing levels of wealth or income over 
which they have no control?33  Should we simply average their 
answers together, and if so, should we weigh the components of 
our average?  Should anybody else have a say?  If so, who? 
Answering all these questions requires us to make value 
judgments—about the value of freedom to develop one’s 
expressive capacities, about what level of material support a 
member of society deserves in exchange for a technological or 
cultural contribution, about our collective obligations to the sick 
and the needy, about the allocation of control over cultural 
development between the last generation and the next one, about 
how to balance respect for individuals with wariness about bias 
and self-interest.  These values are not readily amenable to 
academic quantification.34  Specialized training in law, 
economics, or empirical methods does not confer any privileged 
position in answering these questions.35  My value judgments are 
 
32 These questions implicate deeper philosophical questions about the 
transitivity of value and its aggregation. See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND 
PERSONS 381–90 (1984) (laying out the famous “repugnant conclusion” as a 
challenge to welfarist normative systems that rely on aggregation); LARRY S. 
TEMKIN, RETHINKING THE GOOD: MORAL IDEALS AND THE NATURE OF PRACTICAL 
REASONING 134–39 (2012) (using an example comparing degrees of pain ranging 
from torture to mosquito bites over gradually extending periods of time to dispute 
the transitivity of the “better than” relation in evaluative judgments). 
33 See generally James K. Hammitt & Lisa A. Robinson, The Income Elasticity of 
the Value per Statistical Life: Transferring Estimates Between High and Low Income 
Populations, 2 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 1 (2011). 
34 Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 779, 842 (1994). 
35 To be sure, cost-benefit analysis methodologies are usually explicitly laid out 
and defended against critiques, and this transparency is laudable and important—
perhaps the most important feature of such analyses. See, e.g., id. at 843 (“[I]f goods 
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no better than those of the average person on the street—though 
of course I may believe they are.  The problem here is not merely 
the familiar dilemma that philosophers refer to as 
“incommensurability”36—that we are trying to compare apples 
and oranges—or dollars and lives—when there is no single 
acceptable metric or ordinal relation by which to compare them.  
Nor is it only the tenuousness of the transitivity and aggregation 
conditions that are assumed in cost-benefit analysis.37  The 
deeper problem is that whether something is best thought of as 
an apple or an orange may depend on who is holding it—or 
looking at it—at any particular moment.  Under these conditions, 
nearly all the work of cost-benefit analysis is contained in the act 
of deciding what gets measured, and how.  Thus, the implicit  
 
 
are diverse and valued in different ways, there will be considerable crudeness in 
[cost-benefit analysis of] regulation. . . . We should therefore have a presumption in 
favor of a much more disaggregated accounting of the effects of regulation, one that 
exposes to public view the full set of effects.”). And yes, individual preferences 
revealed in real-world transactions or survey responses can provide some indirect 
evidence of how people weigh tradeoffs between control over their current stock of 
material resources and their goals for an uncertain future, and we can construct 
plausible models by which we can try to derive from those shadows and reflections of 
individual values a comprehensive set of population-wide preferences. See generally, 
e.g., Jacob Goldin & Daniel Reck, Preference Identification Under Inconsistent Choice 
(June 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2417709. But 
even doing this requires the analyst to make contestable assumptions—for example, 
that a society’s collective decision as to how to distribute and marshal its finite 
resources ought to be a function of atomized individual decisions that specific people 
make under—often arbitrarily heterogeneous—individual budgetary or cognitive 
constraints. As another of our panelists, Amy Kapczynski, has argued elsewhere, if 
the existing distribution of those constraints offends our values, a regulatory 
framework that assumes such a distribution may be similarly offensive. Amy 
Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How To Get Beyond Intellectual Property 
Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 996 (2012) (“IP rations access via the price 
mechanism, and so it distributes resources in a way that is sensitive to the 
background allocation of resources. Yet the background allocation of resources may 
be unjust.”). This is equally true of a mode of analysis that assumes such a 
distribution—even where the assumption is simply a result of the limits of the 
methodology itself. For example, attempting to derive a society’s preferences from 
individual preferences—whether revealed in transactions or measured in some other 
way—may simply be an example of the “drunkard’s search” or “streetlight problem” 
endemic to empirical research methods: we measure what we can observe, even if it 
is not what matters. DAVID H. FREEDMAN, WRONG: WHY EXPERTS* KEEP FAILING 
US—AND HOW TO KNOW WHEN NOT TO TRUST THEM 40–46 (2010); ABRAHAM 
KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY 11 (1973). 
36 See generally INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL 
REASON (Ruth Chang ed., 1997); Sunstein, supra note 34. 
37 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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answer to this most fundamental question in cost-benefit 
analysis—who settles disputes over the definition and 
measurement of value—is that the analyst decides. 
To my mind, the most salient objection to empirical analysis 
of the consequentialist justification for IP is not that “it’s 
complicated”38—though it is that.  Rather, the most serious 
problem is that such analysis is not an act of observation, but an 
assertion of power.  It is the act of deciding what counts, how to 
count it, and how to compare it to other sources and measures of 
value.  Of course, resort to the authority of dead white male 
philosophers and their well-considered ideas of what is right and 
good is no less an act of power than the specification of a model 
for cost-benefit analysis.  In both cases, the analyst’s conclusions 
rest on the privileging of a set of values embedded in the 
assumptions underlying their mode of analysis.  My point is not 
that either consequentialism or deontology is true or false; it is 
that people—incredibly smart people!—legitimately disagree on 
that question, as they disagree on what conclusions should be 
drawn from either mode of reasoning.  The fact of that 
disagreement ought to be taken seriously. 
So what does this type of disagreement imply for the conduct 
of scholars studying IP?  This Symposium was convened to try to 
start answering that question.  The title of the Symposium—
“Values, Questions, and Methods”—was selected to reflect the 
issues scholars must face as the value judgments underlying our 
assessments of our object of study are increasingly forced to the 
surface. 
First:  Values.  If the value judgments underlying our 
assumptions are really what drive the outcome of our analyses 
and define the stakes of our debates, then perhaps burying those 
value judgments in the methodology section of a cost-benefit 
analysis or the citations of a philosophical exegesis is not the best 
way to proceed.  Perhaps we ought to direct our arguments to our 
value judgments themselves.  For example, Professor Merges’s 
analysis reveals a default preference for the interests of 
creators;39 Professor Lemley’s analysis reveals a default 
preference for the interests of consumers, or at least for market-
 
38 Lemley, supra note 16, at 1343. 
39 MERGES, supra note 19, at 196 (“[C]reative professionals ought to be a special 
object of interest for IP law and policy.”). 
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based allocations—however we might define those.40  If these 
default preferences are what really drives their disagreement, let 
us debate their merits directly.  And let us be sure to include in 
that conversation as broad and diverse an array of values as 
might be brought to bear on the assessment of IP.  In this 
Symposium Issue, for example, Jan Osei-Tutu argues that we 
ought to value human development as an independent good and 
incorporate it into our priorities for an IP system, raising the 
question how such a value can be integrated into the more 
familiar values that have traditionally been invoked in 
assessment and justification of IP laws.41  Ann Bartow’s 
discussion of how IP law as implemented seems to systematically 
disfavor women requires us to confront the extent to which we 
value gender equity and what we are willing to do in pursuit of 
that value.42  These examples show just how broad an array of 
normative commitments might be implicated by the design of our 
IP laws. 
Of course, it may be that we simply have irreconcilable 
differences of opinion regarding what we think is important, or 
how weighty we think each of our values is relative to the other.  
In such a case, neither academic debate nor even empirical 
evidence is likely to resolve the impasse.  Our disagreement then 
becomes a question of politics, in the nonpejorative sense of 
organizing competing individual priorities into a plan of 
coordinated social action.  Such fundamental differences may 
ultimately have to be resolved through an appropriate social 
choice mechanism—hopefully a democratic one—in which legal 
academics have no particular claim to precedence.  But in 
discussing our normative commitments openly, we may find that 
in fact we have a great deal in common, and that we can identify  
 
 
 
40 Lemley, supra note 16, at 1330–31 (“IP rights represent government 
interventions in the marketplace that seek to achieve that desirable social end by 
restricting the freedom of some people (consumers, reusers, critics) to do what they 
want with their own real and personal property in order to improve the lives of other 
people (inventors and creators). . . . In a market-based economy, regulation requires 
some cost-benefit justification before we accept it.”). 
41 See generally J. Janewa Osei-Tutu, Human Development as an Intellectual 
Property Metric, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 711 (2016). 
42 See generally Ann Bartow, Patent Law, Copyright Law, and the Girl Germs 
Effect, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 579 (2016). 
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our areas of agreement and narrow and sharpen our 
disagreements in such a way as to identify targets for further 
research, discussion, and knowledge building. 
This leads to the second heading of our Symposium: 
Questions.  If indeed people make different value judgments in 
assessing IP systems, one obvious question is what those 
judgments are.  While legal academics can—and should—lay out 
our own value judgments in our scholarship, we are not 
representative of the public at large.  As Greg Mandel shows in 
his contribution to this Symposium, most laypeople have quite 
skewed beliefs about the content of IP law, and implicitly about 
what IP law ought to do.43  If reconciling competing priorities is a 
social choice problem to be tackled by democratic institutions, the 
divergence between lay and expert priorities for IP should 
engender some additional humility on the part of the legal 
academy.44 
Now, assuming we know what we want from our IP system, 
what questions should a scholar of that system investigate?  I 
have already cast some doubt on the ultimate cost-benefit 
question—whether the benefits of IP exceed its costs.  But that 
doubt arises from the absence of agreed truth conditions for that 
question—a problem for the Popperian model under which we 
have been laboring.  But we can still inquire meaningfully into 
the causal relationships between IP laws and human behaviors, 
and about observable and quantifiable costs and benefits arising 
from those behaviors, so long as we are mindful that the answers 
to such questions will always be incomplete.  Nevertheless, even 
an incomplete answer may be a helpful input into the process of 
practical reasoning whereby our knowledge and our values are 
integrated to produce a course of action. For example, Oskar 
Liivak has argued that consequentialists should not be focusing 
on incentivizing innovation at all; that what we should really 
care about is providing a framework for transactions between 
creators and commercializers.45  Under this view, we should 
prioritize scholarly investigation of how law interacts with 
commercialization, rather than with knowledge creation. 
 
43 See generally Gregory N. Mandel, What Is IP For? Experiments in Lay and 
Expert Perceptions, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 659 (2016). 
44 Id. 
45 See generally Oskar Liivak, Stop Rewarding: The Pathologies of Inducing 
Inventions, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 639 (2016). 
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Another set of questions might ask whether IP is serving our 
priorities effectively.  Funmi Arewa’s contribution, for example, 
investigates the interface between the law of copyright and the 
traditions and lived experience of musicians to see whether the 
law is sufficiently accommodating of the creative community it 
purports to serve.46  We could ask similar questions about any 
community that interacts with the IP system—on the producer 
side or the consumer side. 
Once we have a set of questions we want answered, we must 
figure out how to go about answering them.  This is the subject of 
our Symposium’s final heading:  Methods.  Our panelists offer a 
wide array of methodological approaches.  On the empirical side, 
we see tremendous diversity, from the experimental studies of 
Professors Buccafusco, Fromer, and Sprigman to the qualitative 
empirical methods pioneered by Jessica Silbey and the 
comparative analysis and case study methods championed by 
Brett Frischmann.47  This richness of empirical scholarship is 
consistent with the maturation of the empirical turn described 
earlier.  Irene Calboli’s discussion of the benefits of comparative 
legal research offers a more traditional methodological approach, 
one that is perhaps neglected in the current scholarly 
environment.48  And of course, we have considerable 
methodological diversity in papers discussed earlier: the 
theoretical approaches from Professors Bartow, Lemley, Liivak, 
and Merges; and the anthropological approach of Professor 
Arewa, for example.  If there is one thing missing from this 
panel, it is traditional doctrinal scholarship—an omission that is 
perhaps understandable in a Symposium that was convened 
specifically to reflect on scholarship rather than on doctrinal 
developments. 
Mapping these diverse methodologies to scholarly questions 
is not necessarily an easy task.  For all the rich variety and 
sophistication of empirical methods available, I hope I have 
convinced my readers they are not well suited to the ends to 
which they have traditionally been put: proving or disproving 
 
46 See generally Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright and Cognition: Musical 
Practice and Music Perception, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 565 (2016). 
47 See Panel 3, supra note 9. 
48 Irene Calboli, Value, Questions, and Methods in Intellectual Property: A Call 
for Strengthening the Role of Comparative Legal Analysis in the United States, 90 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 609 (2016). 
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that IP rights are a good thing.  But they have tremendous value 
on important questions short of this ultimate value-laden 
question.  Empirical research may not be helpful in telling us 
what we should want.  But it can be very good at telling us 
whether we are getting what we want, so long as we identify 
what we want with precision and it can be observed in the real 
world.  When we have two clearly defined and observable states 
of the world and are measuring the difference in one inherently 
quantitative variable between those two worlds, empirical 
research can be quite helpful.  The most obvious scenario is when 
we define a target for particular outputs of our regulatory 
system—say, a reduction in emissions of a certain pollutant, or 
an increase in the catalog of digital music files available for legal 
streaming—and try to determine whether we are meeting our 
goals or not. 
Moreover, empirical methods are tremendously useful for the 
purpose of informing us what is actually happening in the world 
at its points of interaction with the IP system.  Whether it is 
documenting the experiences of affected communities or probing 
the inner workings of courts and agencies, such research provides 
a rich understanding of how the actual functioning of IP laws 
may differ in nonintuitive ways from what we might predict. 
Of course, a fast-moving field like IP will always have a place 
for traditional doctrinal scholarship.  But the type of theoretical 
scholarship that has long dominated IP—divided as it is between 
law-and-economics consequentialism and Lockean deontology—
has begun to degenerate in ways that are troubling.  It may be 
that these two camps are hardened and irreconcilable, and their 
differences can only be resolved outside the academy.  But I hold 
out hope that a recognition of the value judgments underlying 
these two schools of thought, and a frank discussion of these 
values—informed, perhaps, by more current literatures from 
allied fields, such as philosophy and the various social sciences—
may spark a rejuvenation of IP theory and open up new areas for 
productive inquiry by IP scholars. 
